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Introduction 
In his address to the opening session of the newly 
elected Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) on 12 
May, 1998, Ukraine's President, Leonid Danyelovich 
Kuchmastated: 
[T}he fact that Ukraine does exist and that it will 
remain a sovereign and independent state is not 
subject to any debate. The question is to what 
extent it will be ademocratic, socially-oriented 
and law-governed state and to what extent the 
integrity of the fondamental constitutional 
formula will be ensured 
The question is not a new one. What is new is the 
fatalism it arouses. For in Ukraine as well as abroad, 
the conviction is growing that the authorities lack the 
will, and the country's broader elite the consensus 
necessary to answer the question affrrmatively. The 
parliamentary elections of 29 March - which 
produced not only a parliament of the left, but one in 
which Communists secured 28 per cent of the seats 
- would have demonstrated this lack of consensus 
to anyone who had hitherto doubted it I Yet to the 
well-rehearsed dangers of stalemate between the 
branches of power - a stalemate which seems 
doomed to persist until the presidential elections in 
October 1999 - a growing body of Ukraine's 
friends abroad are morosely coming to the 
conclusion that the executive authorities have lost 
their appetite for reform - and that it is the West, 
rather than Ukraine's President and government; who 
are now the real hostages of 'political games' in 
Ukraine. In Ukraine itself, where cynicism usually 
keeps anxiety under control, the claim that the 
authorities wish 'to ensure the existence of the hard-
line left' to deflect criticism from themselves is 
becoming commonplace'- as is the belief that 
Ukraine's foreign policy has 'exhausted its 
possibilities' and can no longer make up for the 
country's internal weaknesses. 
Yet the answer to the President's question is far 
from predetermined. In comparison to Belarus, 
where democratic, pro-market and pro-Western 
forces are few, fragmented and confused, such 
forces in Ukraine continue to be sizeable, well placed 
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and capable. In security and defence terms, these 
forces have not only adv>:,"ced co-operation with 
the West; they have institutionalised it to a degree 
that will be difficult to reverse. In contrast to the 
Russian Federation, where preoccupations with 
status often impede judgement, Ukraine has no 
great power ambitions and is more easily 
demoralised by the West's indifference than 
aroused by its 'encroachments'. The elite of the 
country, less dynamic and less sure of itself than 
its Russian counterpart, also lacks the gambler's 
instincts which, more thap once, have produced 
bloodshed and ruin. Finally, this country - not only 
more modest and tolerant than its eastern neighbour, 
but economically and geographically more compact 
- is one in which a positive Western influence 
stands a good chance of being appreciated by broad 
sections of society and not just narrow circles of 
people. 
Does this mean that if Ukraine's decline is not 
reversed, it will at least be halted? If Ukraine has 
reached the bottom, there is no doubt that its 
people have the spiritual resources, 
resourcefulness (and food), to live on it. But in the 
land of the Chernobyl catastrophe - a metaphor 
not only for executive irresponsibility, but its 
potentially dire. consequences - the prospect that 
the bottom will give way cannot be discounted. 
The Russian financial crisis, gathering steam as 
these lines are written, makes it almost certain that 
it will drop some more. 'Ukraine does exist', but 
its future is as much of an open question as it was 
in 1991. Ifthe West is to have a significant impact 
on this future, it must work to secure short-term 
conditions that make long-term battles worth 
fighting. It must also attract the attention of 
tomorrow's leaders, it must draw lessons from its 
own policy failures, and it must act quickly. 
Ukraine's place in western interests 
When Xavier Solana, Secretary-General ofNA TO, 
stated in April 1996 that Ukraine 'has an absolutely 
unique role to play in the stability of Europe' , he was 
expressing what had already become the 
conventional wisdom in both the AtlanticAlliance and 
the new democracies of Central Europe. During his 
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visitto Ukraine on 8-9 July, 1998 he tactfully hinted 
that this role posed risks to Europe as well as 
benefits: 
We will enter the new millennium together [ . .] 
Stability, security and accordinglyprosperity in 
Europe cannot be achieved without stable 
relations between Ukraine and NATO member 
countries. 3 
Ukraine's security - its cohesiveness, health and 
tranquillity, and not simply its independence-will 
make five important contributions to the security of 
Europe as well as two important ones outside it. 
Often perceived in the West as a foil to or 'buffer' 
against Russia {and in Russia perceived as a vehicle 
for Western' geopolitical games '), Ukraine not only 
has 'geopolitical' roles to play. These roles are: 
(1) The intrinsic benefits of stability in a country 
of some 50 million people bordering five Central 
European states, two of them designate members of 
NATO. One of Ukraine's neighbours, Poland, is 
burdened already with two arguably abnormal 
neighbours: Kaliningrad Oblast' (part ofthe Russian 
Federation) and Belarus; it has one potentially 
problematic neighbour, Slovakia - and, if courtesies 
are put aside, Lithuania: a country which has not yet 
acquired the strength or confidence to halt the 
activities of Russian criminal structures operating 
within the country or across it. Today, with Poland's 
blessing, an estimated two million people per month 
(the majority of them Ukrainian) cross the Polish-
Ukrainian border and return. Given this context, there 
is an obvious interest that Ukraine should be a secure 
and viable state, integrated into European society and 
commerce, and not (to quote the worst case 
scenario of a senior analyst attached to Ukraine's 
National Security and Defence Council), 'a source of 
additional threats to European countries in terms of 
drugs, weapons, illegal immigrants, prostitutes and 
ecological disasters'.' Poland's interest is shared by 
Hungary, a state whose menu of geopolitical 
complexities- borders with Romania, Slovakia, 
Croatia and Serbia - is rich enough as things stand. 
NATO as a whole has a clear interest in ensuring that 
its ability to meet 'new security challenges' not be 
put to the test in this historically troubled part of the 
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world, where so many national interests intersect. 
(2) Inter-ethnic accord i[1 a multi-ethnic Ukraine 
bordering seven countries is bound to be a 
constructive factor in a region where many of these 
neighbours face the risk of conflict along ethnic, 
regional or economic lines. Like Ukraine itself, 
several of its neighbours suffer from the attributes of 
weakness: a lack of national self-confidence, 
effective pOlitical institutions, strong civic traditions 
and a firm basis oftrust between state and society. 
Despite or perhaps because of these weaknesses, 
Romania and Hungary are ~onscious of the condition 
of their own minorities in Ukraine (400,000 and 
186,000 respectively). With the exception of ethnic 
Russians residing in Crimea (less than half of the . 
11.4 million who reside in Ukraine), those residing in 
the country's 24 oblasti lack the minority 
consciousness and often the distinct ethnic 
consciousness of their Romanian and Hungarian 
counterparts; 5 but this has not prevented nationalist 
and even centrist forces in Russia from demanding 
their 'protection'.' Albeit lacking external protectors, 
the position of the 240,000 strong Tatar minority has 
aggravated tensions between Kyiv and the pro-
Russian popUlation of Crimea- and hence indirectly, 
the relationship between K yiv and Moscow. A 
Ukraine able to maintain civic tolerance and 
strengthen its own cohesion would· certainly not 
weaken the advocates of restraint and tolerance 
elsewhere. But serious instability in Ukraine, whether 
provoked by ethnic tensions or not, would raise 
questions about the safety of 'co-nationals' and 
might even persuade moderates in neighbouring 
countries of the need to maintain a droit de regard 
over their welfare. Such instability would therefore 
expand the inter-state risks associated with minority 
problems in south-central Europe. 
Several of Ukraine's contributions are more 
classically Russo-centric. , 
(3) Dispellingfoars of a resurgent Russia. A 
Russia unable to reabsorb or re-subordinate Ukraine 
stands little chance of restoring its once dominant 
influence in the former Warsaw Pact states of 
Central Europe. Even an issue as emotionally charged 
as NATO enlargement was debated in Central Europe 
with the confidence that a hostile Russian reaction 
would not revive direct threats to the region. Whilst a 
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hostile, more chaotic or more unpredictable Russia 
could indeed pose indirect threats to the region - by 
means of economic pressure, organised crime and 
aggressive intelligence activity- the current 
geopolitical configuration of Europe means that such 
threats could be countered with Western support and 
without the risk of war.7 
(4) Stimulating beneficial change in Russia. So 
long as Russia understands that Ukraine, in the 
words of former Foreign Secretary Maclolm Rifkind, 
is 'here to stay', a beneficial baseline for a realistic 
discussion of Russian interests exists in the Russian 
Federation itself.' That discussion is also likely to 
reinforce liberal perspectives, for there simply are no 
other perspectives that will enable Russia to establish 
mutually beneficial relationships with neighbours who 
are moving closer to Europe. But if it turned out that 
Ukraine, in the words of President Leonid Kuchma, 
was unable to 'stand on its own feet', then the 
baseline of 'realism' would shift, not only 
substantiating expectations that Ukraine's 
independence was a 'temporary phenomenon' , but 
prolonging the authoritarian and coercive 
perspectives that have often been associated with 
such views.' The image of a Ukraine 'unable to live 
apart' from Russia might even foster the beliefthat 
the wider geopolitical shifts associated with the end 
of the cold war in Europe could, over time, be 
reversed. 
(5) Diminishing the 'Russianfactor'in the 
internal politics of former Warsaw Pact countries. A 
Russia no longer seen as a threat or saviour 
contributes, by its geographical remoteness, to the 
generalised perception that change in Central Europe 
is 'irreversible'. 'Irreversibility' not only becomes the 
norm, but the litmus test of seriousness for anyone 
who seeks to play a role in the political affairs of 
these countries. Asked what 'irreversibility' meant, a 
Polish liberal replied, 'it means the left can come 
back to power and it doesn't matter' .10 The revival 
of a unified Russian state stretching to the Bug, the 
Pmt and the Danube would enable the left (and 
perhaps others) to argue that national interests 
demanded 'equidistance' between East and West and 
a 'special' rather than simply a friendly relationship 
with Russia. 
It is therefore not difficult to see why, in Western 
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diplomatic discourse, the association of the terms 
'linchpin' and 'pivot' with.tJkraine has become no 
less customary, or less politically correct, than the 
association of the term 'partnership' with Russia-
for Ukraine's independence has become one of the 
prerequisites oflong-term partnership with a post-
Soviet and post-imperial Russian Federation. 
Two extra-European issues further enhance 
Ukraine's importance. 
(6) DiversifYing the transport and control of 
energy resources. Energy in the Commonwealthof 
Independent States is no lorger tomorrow's political 
issue. In the Russian Federation - where President 
Boris Yeltsin has referred to the Caspian as 'another 
Persian Gulf - the struggle to dominate energy 
transport corridors between Europe and Asia is a 
widely acknowledged geopolitical interest 11 This 
interest, along with the countervailing determination 
of several newly independent states of the Caucasus 
and Central Asia to loosen the grip of Russian 
'energy monsters', is an inescapable part of the 
context in which Turkey, the European Union and 
the United States - not to mention Iran, Iraq and 
China - develop their relations with these newly 
emerging regions. Inescapably, too, this geopolitical 
competition throws Ukraine into relief as a country 
which might provide alternative routes for gas and oil 
originating in Asia - thereby facilitating an open 
energy regime - or which, if its weaknesses are not 
overcome, might find itselfforced to play the role of 
a Russian subsidiary, to the detriment of the plural 
international order which many wish to see 
established in 'former Soviet space'. 
(7) Reinvigorating Turkey's role in NATO. 
Turkey has developed its relationship with Ukraine 
cautiously for fear of alienating Russia, but has 
developed it nevertheless, conscious that it will add a 
north-south dimension to aNA TO-Ukraine 
relationship still seen largely seen in east-west terms. 
This dimension not only strengthens Turkey's weight 
in NA TO- and keeps Turkey within theEuropean 
picture - it increases NATO's sensitivity to 
developments in the Black Sea region ofimmediate 
concern to Turkey. 
These seven interests have generated powerful 
support for Ukraine. Equally, they have generated 
powerful pressures and anxieties. Like pressure, 
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anxiety should be properly targeted. Often the West's 
anxieties reveal more aboutthe West than about 
Ukraine. The West cannot be accused of overstating . 
Ukraine's problems, but it can be accused of 
misidentifyingthem. 
Internal stability: myths and concerns 
After more than two generations of ideologically 
driven East-West conflict, it is understandable that 
Western political elites embraced Simplistic images of 
the etbnic and religious 'detonators' ofinstability 
which they feared would replace it. The CIA's 1994 
report on Ukraine, whilst not the most notorious, 
was surely the most authoritative of several 'expert' 
analyses to raise the spectre of regional separatism 
and inter-ethnic conflict. Although these particular 
fears have not borne fruit, three myths underpinning 
them continue to influence Western images of 
Ukraine. 
The first of these, the Russian-Ukrainian divide, 
ignores at least two realities. The first of these is the 
fact that, for all the generational and regional 
differences that exist in Ukraine, there is little to 
suggest that ethnic Russians hold sharply different 
political views from ethnic Ukrainians of the same 
generation region or economic status. I' The one 
important exception, Crimea, proves the rule, for 
what distinguishes Crimea from other parts of 
Ukraine is not simply the fact that 67 per cent of its 
inhabitants are ethnic Russian, but that close to 
ninety per cent of these Russians immigrated to 
Crimea after the Second World War. The second is 
that irrespective of which language is spoken - it is 
generally accepted that 40-50 per cent of Ukrainian 
citizens speak Russian as a first language (by 
definition many of them etbnic Ukrainians) - the 
majority of Ukrainian citizens, whatever their ethnic 
origin, see no contradiction between wariness or 
even hostility towards rossiyskoye gosudarstvo, the 
Russian state on the one hand and an affinity for 
Russian culture and the Russian people on the other. 
Here again the exception, western Ukraine, proves 
the rule, for whilst more than a third of the territory 
of modern Ukraine had become part of a Russian 
dominated state by the late seventeenth century, and 
whilst the balance of southern and central Ukraine 
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was subdued by Russia between the mid-eighteenth 
century and the end of the N~poleonic wars, the six 
westemmost oblasti (regions) of twenty-four 
succeeded in remaining outside a Russian/Sovietstate 
until 1939, 1940 and 1944.1l 
The second myth, the regional divide, is based on 
a far greater degree of truth. The resentments of 
eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, instrumental in 
denying re-election to Ukraine's first President, 
Leonid Kravchuk in July 1994, are still seen by the 
administration of his successor, Leonid Kuchma, as a 
potential threatto stability. I' Moreover, in a March 
1994 poll, 45.4 per cent ofD"onetsk residents 
identified their nationality as 'Soviet' (though true to 
form, the proportion of ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians adopting this appellation was very 
similar). Yet, as Tor Bukkvoll has noted, local elites in 
the east and south understand that they have far 
greater prospect of advancing their personal interests 
(and possibly those of their constituencies) in an 
independent Ukraine than in a revived Union.ls 
Additionally, whilst there are strong demands for 
greater autonomy, dual citizenship and the elevation 
of Russian to the status of a second official language, 
the electorates of eastern and southern Ukraine have 
not usually voted for political movements opposing 
independence, and they have given virtually no 
support to movements calling for the break-up of 
Ukraine. 
The final myth, the left-wing threat to 
independence, overlooks the fact that the non-
communist left has often been more robust than 
Kuchma's centrists in resisting real or imagined 
Russian encroachments (indeed, in the last Rada the 
support of the patriotic bloc of Communists was 
instrumental to the adoption of the 
Constitution).I' Second, it overlooks the fact that the 
53,000 members of the Crimean Communist Party 
make up over half of all communists in Ukraine.17 
Finally, it overlooks the fact that, whatever Its private 
sentiments, the Communist Party of Ukraine has 
publicly declared its opposition to the break-up of 
Ukraine (unlike much of the Crimean population) and 
since 1995 has been constrained by political 
necessity to endorse independence, albeit not the 
constitution, and albeit within the context of a new 
'Union of Sovereign States' . 
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But by dispelling these myths, we run the risk of 
erecting another: that Ukraine's viability is assured. 
Such a conclusion ignores the real challenges 
confronting Ukraine and other newly independent 
states after the Soviet collapse: the simultaneous 
challenges of building state authority, developing civil 
society, establishing free markets and creating 
representative institutions. Ukraine's liberal and stable 
Western partners had the lUxury of confronting these 
challenges in stages, yet even so, they were not 
always liberal or stable when confronting them. 
Hence, the shortcomings of newly independent states 
after the Soviet collapse: the lack of trust between 
state and society, the dominance of 'subjective' 
private agendas over public responsibilities, the 
incoherence of the legal order, the incompetence of 
state institutions, the relative absence of institutions 
independent of the state and, in both the private and 
public spheres, a lack of accountability and 
transparency. These shortcomings exist not simply 
because of the speed with which the old political 
order collapsed, nor even thanks to the apathy and 
cynicism bred by that order, but because, in addition 
to these burdens, Ukrainians find that old power 
networks have been better at turning change to their 
advantage than those who demanded change in the 
first place. 
It is in these confused and dispiriting conditions 
that security concerns arise and must be addressed. 
Today, as opposed to the immediate post-
independence period, the principal concern is not that 
Ukraine will be directly threatened by its more 
powerful Russian neighbour, but that it will be 
indirectly undennined by those who would exploit 
division, demoralisation and weakness for economic, 
political and geopolitical gain. The apprehension is 
well conveyed in Ukrainian discourse, which draws a 
distinction between the country's nezalezhnist', its 
formal independence, and its samostiynist', its ability, 
in the President's words, to 'stand on its own feet'.I' 
The economic deficit 
To a significant extent, the struggle for samostiynist' 
is the struggle to create economic conditions that 
would give the majority of the country's people faith 
in the political order and their own future. Officially, 
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Ukraine's leaders assert that this struggle is becoming 
more complicated; privately many fear that it is being 
lost. Their apprehensions are well founded. 
First, despite implementation of a courageous and 
successful financial stabilisation programme during 
the first year of Kuchma's presidency (1994-5), the 
economy remains uneconomic. Loss making 
enterprises - those that fail to find customers, 
produce competitive products or produce at all-
not only remain on the books in large numbers; 
according to Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tyhypko, 
their numbers are growing,. and the volume of salary 
debts in the private sector vastly outstrips those in 
the .'budgetary' sphere. I' Not surprisingly, subsidy 
and benefit consume 40 per cent of the state budget, 
but hidden subsidies are vastly more petvasive, more 
expensive and more damaging to market relations 
than those that are officially acknowledged .. 
Second, the country is virtually insolvent. 
According to the President, 'the greater part of 
fmancial resources is being used to service the 
budget deficit and debts owed by the state'. So 
confused are conditions that it has become difficult 
to distinguish debtor and creditor, with state and 
regional budgets (as of August, 1998) owed some 
hryvnya (HRN) 3.8 billion from over 105,000 
enterprises, most of whom are owed money . 
themselves for goods and services. So tight has the 
room for manoeuvre become that the President, 
without tongue in cheek, has argued that' cheap 
foreign loans will solve the problem of our expensive 
domestic loans' (interest on which had reached 72 
per cent in June)." In conditions where the cure and 
the disease are difficult to distinguish, it may well be 
true that foreign loans 'maintain stability' (as the 
President insists) but it might also be said, in the 
words of the old Egyptian fable, that loans and debt 
are not the dam that keeps the poor from drowning, 
but the flood itself.21 
Third, the economy is in large measure a pseudo-
economy, in which substantial income derives from 
speculation and a worrying proportion of wage and 
other monetary obligations are not met. The 
imbalance between (over)-employmentand (under)-
liquidity in the open 'white' economy has made 
three-month wage arrears the accepted standard and 
six month arrears commonplace; no extraordinary 
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expertise is required to see that a state which has 
difficulties financing a $12 billion budget will not 
swiftly repay $2.8 billion in social security arrears." 
As to real money earned and received - the volume 
of which produces a GDP probably double the 
notional figureofHRN 92.48 billion ($49.7 billion) 
[NB: all dollar figures are given in pre-September, 
1998 values 1 and which provides essential supplements 
to a declared per capita inCome of$79 (HRN 158) per 
month, some 50 per cent is 'grey' or 'black', 
bypassing, the banking system, the law and hence the 
tax resources of the state. Well before the financial 
crisis of May, 1998, international financial institutions 
- and the markets themselves" - provided stark 
warnings that the cycle of subsidy, insolvency, 
indebtedness and criminality could no longer be 
sustained. 
It is for this reason that Ukraine's Western 
partners have, with increasing urgency, stressed the 
linkage between Ukraine's security and what for 
want of a better term has been called 'economic 
reform'. But an audit of the past seven years which 
scrutinised only Ukraine's failure to reform, and not 
'reform' itself, would be no audit worthy of the 
name. The dominant Western models of reform-
macroeconomic rather than institutional in focus, 
fmancial and economic rather than political-economic 
in emphasis-were derived from 'medicine' success-
fully applied to poorly functioning or dilapidated 
market economies instead of the command economy 
which Ukraine inherited. This was the West's first 
mistake, and yet it was also the most forgivable, for the 
conditions which Ukraine inherited were without 
precedent. No models of reform, no experience, 
existed to guide those seeking to build a market 
economy on the ruins of one in which anti-market 
practices were not shortcomings, but defining features 
of industry , agriculture, trade, management and labour 
practices and the legal and political order.24 The 
conclusions of the radicals - that Gorbachevian 
gradualism had produced collapse rather than reform, 
and that the command-administrative system could not 
be restored - were and are correct.As a paint of 
departure, strong market measures- the abolition of 
price controls, the establishmentofa stable currency 
- were not only indispensable; at a time when Ukraine 
was experiencing 4,700 per cent armual inflation, they 
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rescued the country from madness. 
The second mistake - th~ elevation of Western 
solutions into dogma -was not forgivable. In the 
West, public rhetoric ('the End of History') nurtured 
the illusion that the Soviet system had been 
overthrown by democrats and free marketeers, 
whereas it had disintegrated under the twin pressures 
of economic crisis and national revival-and col-
lapsed with an apparent suddenness that left many of its 
old power structures intact. This led to the third 
mistake: the assumption that the future would be 
dominated by economic and t~chnical issues, rather 
than by political struggle, not to say a struggle for 
power between institutions, networks and clans. The 
beliefthatmacro-economjc 'disciplines' would be 
sufficientto 'force Soviet directors to behave like 
entrepreneurs', the failure to ask how Soviet era 
elites would impose such disciplines or abide by 
them, the refusal to consider the issue of klo-kogo 
(who-whom?) testified not only to the dominance of 
economists but ofideology. A country already ruined 
by ideology cried out for a measure of political 
economy: an understanding of what happens to first 
rate economic ideas in practice. Had the collective of 
gurus admitted into their circle those who understood 
and respected the legacy of ills being confronted, 
they might have anticipated, and mitigated, three ills 
that are directly attributable to the free market 
'experiment' . 
Insider (,nomenklatura ') privatisation. 25 Despite 
the rhetoric about 'throwing nationalised enterprises 
into the market' the privatisations of the Thatcherl 
Major governments in Britain (e.g. British Airways, 
British Telecom and British Rail) were staged and 
managed. Yet in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
markets were almost non-existent, would-be 
Thatcherites threw enterprises into the market 
without preparation and by utterly inadequate means. 
The preoccupation with forms of ownership rather 
than the quality of management -and with ~peed of 
privatisation rather than the development of 
enterprise-has had anear universal consequence: it 
has transformed bureaucratic dictatorship into 
fmancial control. Rather than devolve economic 
power, the main result of privatisation by voucher, 
fITe sale and stealth was to transfer assets to those 
who, as directors, bureaucrats and middlemen ran 
IFS Into 6/98 
i 
1 
industry before. Far from producing competitive 
entrepreneurship, state planning was largely replaced 
with rigged markets, state monopoly with clan 
oligarchy and state secrecy' with 'shadow 
structures', institutional opacity and the financial-
informational power of cartels. In Ukraine as in 
Russia, the typical source of 'new wealth' has not 
been an enterprise into which investments have been 
made, but an enterprise (like the Artem, Bolshevik 
and Arsenal factories in Kyiv) from which assets 
have been plundered. 
Barter. In theory, the corollary oflow inflation 
and 'sound money' - the holy of holies of Western 
lending institutions-should have been the bankruptcy 
of the inefficient and the 'rational' redeployment of 
labour and assets. Yet even in Thatcher's Britain-
where the government privatised halfofa mere II per 
cent of the country's GDP - the implementation of 
this theory was far from painless and was very strongly 
resisted. In Ukraine, where wholesale bankruptcies 
might have produced the social and physical breakdown 
of a nation, the main effect of'sound money' was a 
flight from the money economy: into the pseudo 
economy (running on promissory notes) and into 
barter. By August 1998, according to government 
statistics, barter accounted for 64.2 per cent of internal 
trade in Ukraine.'" Such a form oftrade is not only 
economically primitive, but politically regressive, 
shutting the bulk of the labour force out of the 
rnarketeconomy,reinforcingthestrength-andthe 
price-setting power- of those who control resources 
and expanding the influence of middlemen at the 
expense of consumers. The power of intermediaries 
(banks, brokers and enforcers) not only imposes a 
colossal tariff(typically30 per cent) on the price of 
agricultural products and raw materials, it compounds 
what the President has called the 'amorphousness' of 
all transactions. Thanks to this amorphousness, devel-
opment funds and wage arrears dispatched to the 
mining sector simply failed to reach theirrecipients, 
producing- in both Russia and Ukraine-strikes, 
blockades and regional states of emergency in the 
spring ofl998. 27 
Speculation instead of stabilisation. Even· before 
the Russian financial crisis began, 95 per cent of 
Ukrainian bank loans were granted for a period of one 
year or less." Such loans will rarely attract investors, 
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for over such a short period, there are few worthy 
investments that will bear fruit. It is debatable whether 
Western 'stabilisation' funds have curbed this short-
term, speCUlative bias in Ukrainian financial markets or 
worsened it by creating the illusion ofliquidity - not 
to say the illusion that austerity could be deferred and 
that government spending would be backed by interna-
tionalloans. It is probably no coincidence that former 
Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko's issue ofa large 
volume of treasury bills in the firsthalfofl997-
described by Deputy Prime Minister Tyhypko as 
'criminally detrimental to the state and the popula-
tion'" - coincided with fresh multi-billion dollar 
commitments from the IMF and other Western lending 
institutions." 
The civic deficit 
Incontrastto Russia-where a 'Eurasian' focus and a 
resistance to 'dissolving' into the West have been 
major themes of political discourse- Ukraine since 
1991 has unequivocally proclaimed the 'strategic 
challenge' of becoming a 'full member of the European 
family of civilised nations'." Nevertheless, these 
authorities and their Western supporters have tended to 
underestimate this challenge in two different respects. 
First (as we have noted elsewhere) Ukraine's political 
leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve 
integration by declaration, or simply by joining and 
participating in international organisations and political 
clubs, rather than by undertaking concrete structural 
changes." Fortheirpart, Ukraine's Western advisers 
have been inclined to treat the fundamental problems 
of 'transition' as problems of the economy rather 
than of the state, the society and the country's 
institutions. Examination of the reform process and. 
its many paradoxes and distortions demonstrates the 
weakness of state and society in Ukraine. Such an 
examination provides frequent and vivid reminders 
that 'the totalitarian project was the project of 
suppressing civil society'." While Western 
. authorities acknowledge that democracies and 
market economies require a supportive institutional 
framework within which to function - and whilst 
the Know How Fund, TACIS and other bodies have 
taken several practical steps to develop this framework 
- resources devoted by Western governments to 
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Ukraine's institutional developmenth~ve lagged well 
behind those allocated to financial stabilisation and . 
macro-economic reform. At a time when the totalitar-
ian system still existed, John Gray defined civil society 
as: 
the domain of voluntary associations, market 
exchanges and private institutions within and 
through which individuals having urgent 
conceptions and diverse and often competitive 
purposes may coexist in peace 
Now that the totalitarian system has collapsed, the 
post-Communist landscape reveals that the former 
regime succeeded not only in 'suppressing' this 
domain, but destroying it. The extent of this 
destruction leads us to a conclusion that was not 
always apparent in the past: without the construction 
of a truly civic state, a civic society has little chance 
of coming into being. The formal features of such a 
state - adherence to recognised constiMional 
arrangements, regular and free elections, guarantees 
of basic civil rights, an impartial civil service and an 
independent judiciary - are widely agreed upon. The 
problem is that they risk becoming purely formal, if 
not bogus features unless they are animated by 
principles which are still weak in Ukraine, either 
because the totalitarian system rejected them or 
because they have failed to survive the traumas of 
post-Communist change. 
Authority has primacy over power. Authorities use 
power for legitimate purposes: those for which 
power is given. They are meantlo be the guardians 
of the law, not its beneficiaries. Where a civic state 
exists, customs officers seize goods because they are 
contraband, not because the state customs service 
depends upon them as a source of 'nonbudgetary 
finance', newspapers are audited by the tax 
authorities because of tax violations, not because 
they support opposition political movements,34 and 
banks are placed under receivership because of 
financial malfeasance and not because they fail to 
contribute sufficiently to Presidential election 
campaigns." Even in the best civic state, departures 
from these norms occur; in the worst of them they 
might even be frequent, but they are never 'normal'. 
Authority is capable of acting within the sphere 
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of responsibility entrusted to it. Where the country's 
most senior jurists regard ~e legal profession as 
'practically defenceless', where (in the words of the 
former Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament)the 
authorities' only exercise their powers formally, 
without having any real impact on the situation in the 
country,''' then ordinary people may find they have 
little choice but to defer to a 'mestniyavtoritet' (a de 
facto local authority) which, whatever its legal 
status, enforces and delivers. 
When authority possesses both of the attributes 
above, its strength is considerable, and it is generally 
able to secure compliance ~ithout intimidation or 
coercion. But in Ukraine, the expression 'the power 
of authorities' tends to be a misnomer: power is 
inadequate, but at the same time it is often used 
inconsistently or arbitrarily. Thus, whilst a vast state 
service exists (by Kuchma's testimony 300,000), it 
will not become a civil service until it is stable, 
impartial, professional and competent. In Anatoliy 
Grytsenko's view the absence of these attributes in 
Ukraine provokes 'a situation where high and middle 
level authorities come and go, producing no system, 
no continuity and no results in the long-term'." 
The arbiter of disputes is law, a legal system 
meeting HLA Hart's requirement: 'the unity of 
primary and secondary rules'. In Francoise Thorn's 
definition, law in totalitarian states was simply 
'codified arbitrariness': regulations without any 
connecting principle exceptlhe interest of the 
lawmakers. Absent the totalitarian state, law in a 
post-Communist country like Ukraine risks becoming 
codified anarchy: not only inconsistent, but the object 
of so many 'reforms' as to leave the citizen (or 
investor) utterly confused as to where he stands 
from one day to the next. Hence the President's 
judgement: that 'no adequate and stable legal basis 
has been created for economic relations'." Given 
this fact, it is entirely understandable that Deputy 
Prime Minister Serhy Tyhypko was put in bharge of 
an extra-legal 'rapid reaction group' designed to clear 
legal obstacles (i.e., override the country's laws) to 
foreign investment. 39 But as this example 
demonstrates, a body of laws that is unobserved and 
often unobservable risks proJ1loting lawlessness at the 
highest level. For those not privileged to operate at the 
highest level, the complexity and 'negotiability' of the 
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legal order makes corruption essential to survival. 
Where corruption is essential, 'laws on corruption' can 
easily degenerate into instruments of persecution 
against opponents.'" 
There is a fondamental congruence between the 
goals of the state and those of its core institutions 
and instruments. In a civic state, the armed forces 
see themselves as tools of the civil power, not as a 
state within the state, let alone an alienated force. 
Security services are imbued with the values of the 
current constitutional order and have no confusion 
about the state (and civil liberties) they are sworn to 
protect. Moreover, the principles underpinning 
security policy, military doctrine, force structure and 
the education and training of servicemen are 
standardised and compatible. Although the authorities 
in Ukraine proceeded swiftly and successfully after 
independence to establish truly national armed forces 
under politically reliable commanders, three problems 
persist: the chronically poor, demoralising (and 
potentially destabilising)material condition of the 
forces, the proliferation of military structures (some 
heavily armed and some poorly regulated) operating 
outside the framework of the Ministry of Defence 
and the discontinuity between a national security 
policy based on non-alignment, integration with 
Europe and close partnership with NATO and a 
situation where, 'sitting in classes, Ukrainian officers 
are rehearsing a situation in which a coalition of 
western and southern states comprising 50 divisions 
attacks Ukraine'." 
Where the non-state sphere is concerned, 
congruence is almost as important. Those who 
should be the strongest exponents of the market 
economy - entrepreneurs and banks-do not always 
live up to this expectation in Ukraine. With regard to 
many self-styled entrepreneurs (including a large 
proportion of the 'pro-business' deputies in the newly 
elected parliament), the judgement of the Ukrainian 
Centre ofIndependentPolitical Research is worth 
citing: 
Their idea of a perfoct economic model is based 
on the availability of state guarantees, taxation 
benefits for the selectedfow, unlimited barter and 
exclusive conditions for business with no com-
petitors around" 
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With regard to banks, what William Tompson has 
observed in Russia can be applied with equal force to 
Ukraine: 
Thefonctions performed [ . .} resemble those of 
their Soviet predecessors more than those of 
banks in developed market economies. During 
the Soviet period, banks fonctioned as servants of 
the state rather than of their clients: they served 
as organs of financial control over client 
enterprises, as channels for the allocation of state 
fonds and as means of mpbilising domestic 
savings to finance the state's internal debt. What 
banks did not do in the Soviet system was to 
bank, i. e. to intermediate fonds. In 1997 [the 1 
new commercial banks remain, to a striking 
extent, organs of financial control, channels for 
the allocation of state fonds and mechanisms for 
mobiliSing domestic savings to finance the state's 
internal debt - and they still do relatively litt/e 
intermediation of fUnds." 
By the same token, a state customs policy which 
penalises foreigners for buying Ukrainian goods," 
and a taxation system which encourages tax evasion 
rather than enterprise, also demonstrate a lack of 
congruence between state policy and the realities of 
life on the ground. Once again, these examples show . 
how easy it is for a country's declared goals to be 
undermined by its own laws and its own servants. 
The political, economic and legal spheres have 
integrity and autonomy. In a civic state it is assumed 
that judges and prosecutors will act in accordance 
with legal, rather than political norms; businessmen 
fmd that, whatever their personal ambitions, the 
economy forces them to make business decisions by 
business criteria The state funds its activities by 
open, public means - taxation - and whilst officials 
might aspire to wealth after they leave government, 
they do not expect to enrich themselves whilst in its 
employ. But in Ukraine, as in Russia, the pendulum 
has rapidly swung from a totalitarian system which 
made the very cOlicept of private interest illegitimate 
to an ostensibly democratic one which proceeded to 
privatise all concerns, including the state itself. In these 
conditions, where distinctions central to the civic order 
- 'state' vs. 'privi!te', 'military' vs. 'civilian', 
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'political'vs 'economic' - have been substantially 
eroded, the most effective authority often turns out 
to be money. Given this fact, power ministries that 
lack business interests risk losing power. 
Organisations, state and private, have the 
necessary transparency to make accountabilitya 
meaningfid term and informed decision making 
possible. In the Soviet Union- where secrecy was 
fostered as a positive value-the Communist Party 
and KGB ensured that power structures remained 
transparentto their political masters, even if they 
were closed books to everybody else. Paradoxically, 
the collapse of the CPSU - and the transformation of 
the KGB from Party watChdog to commercial network 
- has sometimes multiplied possibilities for opacity 
and deception and has made 'financial-informational 
struggle' an elemental part oflife." By disguising the 
locus of decision making, the identity of decision 
makers and the content of decisions, such a state of 
affairs is inimical to democracy by definition. It also 
ensures that outsiders engage in economic activity (and 
investment) at their peril. Today, such outsiders can 
include the Ukrainian government itself, as shown by 
the fact that funds distributed by Kyiv to miners in 
eastern regions in 1997-8 simply ended up in other 
hands. These shortcomings are only multiplied by the 
paucity of reliable statistics and honest statisticians. So 
long as (by the admission of the Agriculture minister) 
the state' does not keep statistics' on grain exports," so 
long as there is no system for recording individual 
pension contributions, 47 so long as the volume of 
inter-enterprise debt is a state secret, the processes 
of budgeting, financing and monitoring will be 
carried out poorly, if at all." More ominously still, the 
absence of disclosure laws on investors and 
shareholders will be an invitation for criminal 
structures (and hostile foreign interests) to try to 
dominate the privatisation process. 
The beginning to wisdom is to understand that 
these shortcomings not only exist, but that they 
reflect the realities of power in Ukraine. Unless these 
realities are challenged, the risk is that 'transition' will 
became anew status quo, with its 'new class' who have 
an interest in preserving it. As the President has 
acknowledged, these tendencies are not only an 
obstacle to a thriving economy; they are a threat to 
social concord and the ability of the country 'to rally 
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together at a crucial moment'." In short, they are a 
threat to national security. . 
The burden on security policy 
Civic threats to Ukraine, serious as they are in their 
own right, do not inhabit a world of their own, 
separate from the intentions and behaviour of 
external powers. Where Ukraine's most problematic 
neighbour, the Russian Federation is concerned, they 
might rather affect the way in which threats develop 
and in which hostile intenti,:ms might be pursued. 
This could be particularly true in the case of Russia, 
for there security and defence structures are 
dominated by a post-Leninist elite which understands 
that military force is only One 'tool of struggle' 
amongst many. There, as in Ukraine, power 
structures are often opaque, the distinction between 
'public' and 'private' has substantially broken down, 
and numerous networks arise between state and 
supposedly private interests. Moreover, for better and 
for worse, these networks often interpenetrate, 
thanks to the close economic ties between the two 
states and the 'amorphousness' of Ukraine's 
economic, financial and administrative structures. 
In the unlikely event that conflict should arise in 
Ukraine, it could well turn out to be a non-
Clausewitzian, 'bottom-up' conflict: a conflict that 
risks proceeding from the social to the political, from 
the powerless to the powerful and from the local to 
the national and, at worst, to the international level. In 
such a conflict, the element of political intention-
not to say of calculation, machination and 
provocation - may intrude from several directions and 
at any number of points. But in contrast to the conflict 
scenarios envisaged in the cold war era, the dynamics 
of such a conflict might not be explicable in the 
traditional Clausewitzian termsof'ends' and 'means'. 
Instead, the dynamics could prove to be combustible, 
threatening to escape the control of those who seek to 
'use' them. By the same token, such a conflict could 
have an apparently non-security origin: ecological (a 
burst dam or chemical accident), financial (the collapse 
ofa bankor savings scheme),economic (the with-
drawal of state housing subsidy), or industrial (a 
mining/railway dispute). But in conditions where both 
state and society are weak, the risk is that however 
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such conflicts begin, they will escalate swiftly, both 
horizontaIlyand vertically-geographically and in 
intensity - presenting challenges to the state (and 
possibly the international community) before they are 
prepared to meet them. 
Those who study the National Security Concept of 
Ukraine, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 16 
January, 1997, might well conclude that the 
foregoingana1ysis is shared by Ukraine's national 
security elite, not least by the country's National 
Security and Defence Council: that body which, 
according to the 28 June 1996 constitution, 'co-
ordinates and controls the activity of executive 
bodies in the sphere of national security and 
defence'. The Concept is not only tribute to this 
establishment's ability to present potent analyses in 
politically correct language. It demonstrates that for 
all the real deficiencies of armed forces and security 
structures, Ukraine possesses a critical mass of 
decision makers with the power to make policy and a 
willingness to entertain radical changes in the way 
the state defines and responds to its security 
challenges. The emergence of this document is 
especially noteworthy for a military establishment 
which, only recently, understood war almost 
exclusively in tenns of combined arms, strategic 
operations against large, technically sophisticated 
(and nuclear armed) enemy coalitions. In three 
respects, the document commands attention. 
• It articulates a conceptually rich catalogue of 'main 
potential threats' (political, economic, social, military, 
ecolOgical, Scientific and technological-infonnational) 
based on the premise that 'situations.threatening our 
national security are in most cases precisely regionaf 
and that security is likely to be threatened by the 
'combination of factors' in specific regions." 
• It calls for a co-ordinated, cost-effective division 
of labour between law-enforcement, security and 
military bodies subordinated to the Ministry of 
Defence. It is understood that the latter's function is 
to localise an area of tension swiftly and prevent the 
'combination of factors' escalating or being exploited 
by external actors. 
* It demands what is urgent not only in Ukraine, but 
throughout East-Central Europe: defence mindedness 
of the part of civil agencies (health, safety, 
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emergency services) and an understanding of the 
non-military dimensions of security by national 
armed forces. 
Ukraine's vigorous participation in Partnership for 
. Peace (in well over 100 exercises since accession on 
8 February, 1994) and bilateml exercises 'in the spirit 
ofPFP' has been designed, from a military-
opemtional perspective, to develop the capabilities 
required to meet these security challenges. The 
Ukrainian perspective on Sea Breeze-97 (provided by 
Rear Admiral Y uriy Sahlyt, Deputy Commander of 
the exercise) certainly bears this out: 
In local corif/icts or national disasters, which 
can also provoke corif/icts, it is precisely 
military units with the right training that can 
and should set up a zone which would make it 
possible to direct or influence the processes 
occurring outside it, promote the consolidation 
of stability and order in the country or region 
and create the necessary conditions for the work 
of units from the Ukrainian Emergency 
Situations Ministry [emphasis added)'1 
This fruitful participation in PFP, not to say the 
equally successful relationship with NATO, 
represents a major accomplishment of the foreign 
policy as well as the security establishment. In the 
diplomatic sphere, too, vulnembilitieshave been well 
understood and opportunities well exploited. 
The burden on foreign policy 
In only the most literal sense would it be an 
exaggemtion to label Ukraine' sMinisters/vo 
Zakordonykh Sprav (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as 
the country's greatest force multiplier: literally, 
because the spectacular accomplishment of the MZS 
has been to compensate for weakness rather than 
multiply strength. Great as the professionalism and 
vigorous as the activity of this body has been, both its 
successes, and those of Ukraine' s President, owe less 
to these qualities than to a shrewd understanding of 
Ukraine's geopolitical position in Europe. The result of 
this understanding has been a mnogovektomiy(multi-
vectored) foreign policy which has often been more 
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controversial inside Ukraine than it has been abroad. 
At least four vectors exist, the first two of them 
more interdependent than the country's authorities 
would sometimes like. 
The first of these, the primary vector - that 
which arouses the greatest enthusiasm, but also 
poses the greatest challenges - is the Western 
vector: that which directly supports the 'strategic 
challenge' of becoming a 'full member of the 
European family of civilised nations'. Yet Ukraine's 
mainstream, centrist political establishment (as 
opposed to Rukh and a number of other 'national 
democrats') believe that Ukraine's integration into the 
West will not be achieved without success along the 
second vector: a 'special partnership' with Russia, 
i.e. the conviction in Russia that a friendly and 
independent Ukraine represents the best of all 
possible worlds. Equally, they believe that there will 
be no such partnership unless the West displays a 
strong stake in Ukraine's security. In the eyes of this 
centrist mainstream, the Janus-like policy is dictated 
not only by the cultural identity of Ukraine and the 
country's economic weakness; it is dictated by the 
attitude of the West. For contrary to the hopes of 
many Ukrainian 'national-democrats'thatthe West 
would embrace 'European Ukraine' as a bulwark or 
buffer against 'Euro-Asiatic' Russia, the fact - well 
appreciated by Kuchma - is that the post-cold war 
West finds it politically and psychologicallydifficult 
to make choices between partnership with Ukraine 
and Russia. Because Kuchma knows that the West is 
unlikely to make this choice, he has been determined 
not to give them one. Therefore,just as internal 
stability and Western support have been seen as the 
precondition for securing friendly relations with 
Russia, so friendly relations with Russia have been 
seen as the precondition for drawing closer to the 
West. 
The third vector, Central Europe, naturally 
reinforces the Western one. The 1992 Friendship 
Treaty between Ukraine and Poland (and Poland's 
renunciation ofGalicia-Volhynia, annexed by the USSR 
in 1939) established a direction which, under both 
Kravchuk and Kuchma, has aimed to entwine Ukraine 
with the economic and security arrangements of 
Central Europe as closely as the states of this region 
would allow. Progress along this road has been marked 
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by Ukraine's admission to the Central European 
Initiative Cl June, 1996), th~ Ukrainian-Romanian 
Friendship Treaty (May 1997) and through the 
triangular relations system - Ukraine-Poland-
Romania and Ukraine-Moldova-Romania-
established at Ukraine's initiative. It has been further 
advanced by Ukraine's association with Baltic-Polish 
endeavours- notably the May, 1997 Tallinn 
communique supporting the Baltic states' applications 
for NATO membership, as well as by Ukraine's 
effort to link security arrangements in the Baltic and 
Black Sea regions (most p~blicly in the Ukraine 
sponsored Black Sea-Baltic Sea Conference 
scheduled to take place in Yalta in September, 1999). 
A fourth vector is collaboration with members of 
the CIS (notably but not exclusively the other 
members ofGUAM: Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova) who openly share Ukraine's opposition to a 
supra-national model ofCIS integration. This applies 
to peace keeping - which Ukraine insists must take 
place on CIS territory on the same basis that it takes 
place elsewhere: under a UN or OSCE mandate. 
Therefore, whilst Ukraine is willing to participate in 
peacekeeping within the C1S (and deploys three 
observers in Tajikistan at the present time), it will not 
accept the Russian view that 'peacekeeping in the 
CIS' is a distinct activity, operating under norms and 
command arrangements peculiar to this region. 52 • 
The agreement, within the GUAM framework, to 
establish an Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine peace-
keeping battalion for possible deployment in the 
'Eurasian Corridor' (16 September, 1998) has given 
substance to this position, if at the same time 
appearing to give substance to Russia's charge that 
GUAM is intended to weaken the CIS. The latter 
charge is one that is rejected by Ukraine, first on the 
grounds that it is Russia which has made the CIS 
ineffective by seeking to transform it into a 
centralised body giving supra-national exp,ression to 
Russian interests; second, by arguing that the CIS 
should become a catalyst to economic cooperation by 
lowering barriers between member states. 
Increasingly, two other directions of policy could 
be termed vectors in their own right. The first of 
these is the development of direct, mutually profitable 
relations with resource rich regions of the Russian 
Federation itself (for example, Tatarstan, 
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Bashkortostan and Kemerovo). The second, 
promising far greater dividends, is the vector of 
Black Sea co-operation - it is partly through 
Ukraine's efforts that the Forum of Black Sea Co-
operation was transformed into a UN recognised 
international organisation in 1997 - with special 
emphasis on co-operation with Turkey. The 
importance of Turkey and the 'south' generally not 
only reinforce Ukraine's growing involvement in 
Caspian Sea questions; it has also encouraged 
efforts, within the confmes of international sanctions 
regimes, and with understandable subtlety, to explore 
common economic interests with Iran and Iraq. 
Yet in conditions where internal weaknesses are 
deepening rather than lessening, three risks present 
themselves. 
The first of these is that today's mnogovektorniy 
policy evolves into distinct foreign policies. The 
rumour that a condition of Borys Tarasyuk's 
appointment as Foreign Minister on 17 April, 1998 
was that he keep 'hands of!' the eastern vector 
might have no basis in fact, but in current conditions 
it stiIl makes sense. The second, far greater risk, 
relates to the first: that Ukraine loses the capacity to 
be a proactive participant in the' emerging structure 
of European security' and simply becomes an object 
of vectors originating outside it. 
The third danger is Western disiIlusionment. In 
the pre-Kuchmaera, the dominant Western image of 
Ukraine was of a Yugoslavia in the making, armed 
with nuclear weapons. So effective was Ukraine's 
political establishment at countering this fallacious 
image that during the early-to-mid Kuchma years, the 
US Congress and British Parliament had begun to 
perceive Ukraine as becoming like Poland, if not yet 
'like us'. The danger in the late Kuchma era is that 
this mutually flattering image will be replaced by one 
as damaging as the first: that Ukraine is an 
'endemically corrupt', 'economic basket case' in 
which aid and assistance are 'squandered'. In a 
sound-bite culture, if the question, 'Ukraine?' evokes 
the answer 'corruption', thenthesupportwhich Ukraine 
has come to take for granted (and depend upon) could 
be injeopardy despite the strategic interests of the 
Western world. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Ukraine has been 
increasingly finding itself subject to two distinct, if 
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not contradictory; vectors of Western policy: that 
pursued by NATO and that pursued by the European 
Union. With anxiety and surprise, knowledgeable 
Ukrainians are coming to the conclusion that the 
latter vector operates according to principles which 
are rather distinct from NATO's and which Ukraine 
may have limited ability to influence. 
Nato-Ukraine cooperation 
Few Ukrainians involved with NATO would dispute 
that the perspective of Xavier. Solana cited at the 
outset of this paper characterises NATO's approach 
to Ukraine at all levels. The 1997 programme of co-
operation between NATO and Ukraine included some 
300 items. The picture is similar with regard to many 
individual members ofNA TO who, outside PFP and 
through their own national structures, maintain 
bilateral programmes of defence and military co-
operation with Ukraine. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, this programme now amounts to some 95 
items per annwn: the largest bilateral defence 
programme that the UK maintains outside NATO and 
the second largest that Ukraine maintains (surpassed 
only by its programme with the United States). 
Where NATO itself is concerned, Ukraine relies upon 
the following multilateral mechanisms to give the 
relationshipsubstance: 
• the Mission of Ukraine to NATO 
• the NATO-Ukraine Commission 
• the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Memorandum of 
Understanding, establishing a Joint Working Group 
on Military Reform and a Joint Working Group on 
Emergency Preparedness. 
• NATO Information Centre in Kyiv 
• NATO Permanent Liaison Officer 
Ukraine also supports this relationship with three 
national mechanisms: 
• the State Programme for NATO-Ukraine Co-opera-
tion 
• the State Inderdepartmental Commission, 
established in May, 1997 and designed to provide a 
legal basis for co-operation, co-ordinate ministerial 
activity and bring relevant assessments and proposals 
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to the President of Ukraine 
• the establishment of units or sections for NA TO-
Ukraine co-operation in all relevant government 
ministries 
Despite these programmes and mechanisms - and 
despite the fact that Ukraine was, on 8 February 
1994, the first CIS country to accede to Partnership 
for Peace - there is a fundamental difference 
between the aims ofUkraine-NA TO co-operation and 
the aims pursued by Ukraine's Central European 
neighbours. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
are prospective NATO members - and, as such, 
countries that have occasionally taken the view that 
national security policies are unnecessary. Ukraine 
cannot presume that it is a prospective NATO 
member, nor can it presume that NATO would 
provide collective defence if Ukraine fell victim to 
aggression." Ukraine has therefore focused its 
efforts on achieving a large measure of de facto 
integration with NATO, whilst developing its own 
National Security Concept. As already discussed, 
Ukraine has astutely tailored its military co-operation 
with NATO to support the national goals which the 
Concept puts forward. 
On a military-politicallevel, the intensifYing web 
of co-operation with NATO supports objectives 
which are no less profound than those which exist at 
the military-operational level. The overwhelming 
benefit of the NATO-Ukraine relationship is the 
establishment of networks which both institutionalise 
and personalise the West's commitment to enhance 
what Horbulin has called Ukraine's 'role in ensuring 
European political and economic stability'. These 
networks in turn reinforce the standing of those 
inside Ukraine who believe that national security 
structures, without losing their distinctiveness or 
their pertinence to local conditions, should evolve in 
ways compatible with NATO patterns of co-
operation, professionalism, transparency and 
democratic civilian control. Not least of all, such 
networks reduce the risk that Ukraine will find itself 
isolated in disputes with neighbours and correspond-
ingly increase the risk that threats to Ukraine will set 
offalarmsthroughoutthe 'common European house'. 
Indeed, NATO's enlargement, along with the scale and 
depth ofNA TO's defence co-operation with Ukraine 
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(and the Baltic states) could gradually blur the 
practical distinction between NATO membership and 
full PFP participation,particularly ifNA TO continues 
to acquire more of a military-political and less of a 
military orientation. Ukrainians nevertheless 
appreciate NATO's military dimension and have 
approvingly cited at least one high-level assurance 
that Partnership for Peace allows for joint operations 
with NATO in the event of a threat to a member's 
territorial integrity." 
EU cooperation: an !!mpty chalice? 
Although Ukraine's officials rule out any intention of 
joining NATO 'in the foreseeable future', since the 
time of Ukraine's independence, membership of the 
European Union has been proclaimed as one of the 
country's most important long-term goals. Yet until 
recently, co-operation with the European Union has 
advanced slowly when it has advanced at all. To be 
sure, the EU has not been hostile to Ukraine. As long 
ago as November, 1994, the European Council's 
Common Position on Ukraine (CFSP/94n79) 
emphasised the need for a strong political 
relationship, support of the country's independence 
and territorial integrity, backing for political and 
economic reforms, improvement of nuclear safety 
and integration into the world economy. Between 
199 I -6 EU economic assistance to Ukraine totalled 
ECU 3. I 7 billion, of which ECU 1.90 billion came 
from member states and ECU 1.27 billion from the 
Community. Moreover, the Political Cooperation 
Agreement (which came into effect in March 1998) 
established two new agencies of institutional 
cooperation: an annual ministerial Cooperation 
Council and a parliamentary Cooperation Committee. 
What the EU can be faulted for is a lack of 
enthusiasm at working level and a lack of strategic 
vision at the top. Two contrasts-between tJ:te EU-
Russia relationship on the one hand and the NA TO-
Ukraine relationship on the other-have not only been 
marked, they have induced much disorientation in Kyiv. 
Given the substantial overlap between EU and NATO 
membership, the disorientation is understandable. 
Nevertheless, Ukraine's foreign policy professionals 
are learning from hard experience that, like NATO's 
multilateral structures, the EU' s executive bodies 
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foster their own institutional culture and their own 
'habits of co-operation'; they are also recognising that 
in Western European capitals there is little overlap 
between officials responsible for carrying out NATO 
and EU policy. The practical fear in Kyiv is that unless 
this climate and institutional culture change, EU 
enlargement - in direct contrast to its NATO analogue 
- could paradoxically distaoce Ukraine from the West 
and even endanger the country's vital economic 
interests. 
Although the reasons behind the EU-Russiaand 
NATO-Ukraine discrepancies arouse perplexity in 
Ukraine, the discrepancies themselves are not in 
question. Whereas NATO and national defence 
ministries have refused to tie co-operation with 
Ukraine to their level of co-operation with Russia-
recognising, were they to do so, that Russia would 
acquire de facto control over a vital aspect of 
Ukrainian policy" - the EU has never allowed 
Ukraine to advance closer to itself than Russia and in 
some cases has kept it well behind, despite the fact 
that EU membership is not an officially proclaimed 
Russian goal. Is it purely on economic grounds that 
whilst Ukraine began to negotiate a Political Co-
operation Agreement with the EU six months in 
advance of Russia, its agreement came into force 
four months behind that of its northern neighbour? 
(Ukraine's PCA, concluded in June 1994 and ratified 
by Ukraine in 1995, only entered into force on I 
March 1998). Had the United States not placed the 
issue on the agenda of the first joint EU-USA meeting 
in December, 1997, even this deadline might have 
slipped. The impression of a double standard 
between Ukraine and Russia is only reinforced by 
European Council's recent decision to recognise 
Russia as a 'market economy' (along with China) 
whilst leaving Ukraine's 'transitional economy' status 
unaltered, despite the fact that Ukraine's economic 
ills are not different from Russia's own - and in the 
wake of the Russian fmancial crisis might even be 
deemed to be less serious. 
But even where Russia is not at issue, Ukrainians 
find themselves perpetually in the role of demandeur, 
whereas with NATO and bilateral defence 
programmes the traffic of proposals and initiatives 
has been vigorous and reciprocal. Even with regard 
to the December, 1996 EU Action Plan - which 
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appropriately linked Ukraine's integration into 
Europe's security structures with integration into 
Europe's economy - the main force for implemen-
tation has been the United States, thereby prompting 
the fear in Kyiv that the Plan could be 'taken out into 
the woods and lost' by 'good EU bureaucracy'. 
The December 1997 Luxembourg European 
Council decisions constitute a further source of 
vexation, indeed anxiety. The vexation stems from 
the fact that, in addition to inviting six states to begin 
accession negotiations with the EU, the Council also 
identified five second-tier ~tates whose admission 
would be placed on a slower track: Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. From the 
perspective of the EU, the Luxembourg decisions 
were almost automatic, based on criteria adopted by 
the 1992 Copenhagen Council, which made the 
conclusion of Association agreements pre-requisiteto 
accession negotiations. Yet reminders of the absence 
ofa Ukraine-EU AssociationAgreementhave, from 
the vantage point ofKyiv, merely reinforced the 
conviction that Ukraine is being excluded: a 
conviction surely not diminished when the March, 
1998 London Conference, under the British 
Presidency, rebuffed Ukraine's plea for a political 
statement acknowledging and supporting Ukraine's 
long-term vocation for EU membership. The fact 
that several of the second-tier states designated by 
Luxembourg have economies as weak and distorted 
as Ukraine's also reinforces the sense of double 
standards within the European Union. 
Debatable these perceptions are. But the anxiety 
which arises from them is both realistic and 
concrete. As treaty commitments currently stand, the 
accession of Poland and Hungary to the EU threatens 
to erect a formidable economic barrier between 
Ukraine and these two neighbours. This is no 
inconsiderable worry, bearing in mind that Poland is 
Ukraine's third largest trading partner (when the grey 
market is taken into account) and that, thanks to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, opt-outs from the Schengen 
agreement on frontier controls are no longer on offer. 
The impact of Sch,ngen could have a dramatic 
impact on two countries whose cross border traffic 
(today visa free) currently amounts to two million 
people per month. 
The divergences between the processes of NATO 
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and EU enlargement are not simply in the eye of the 
beholder. What then accounts for the difficulties that 
Ukraine is experiencing? 
First there is the model of integration which the 
EU has adopted. The aim of the European Union is 
not to soften barriers with non-members, but to 
deepen integration between members. In practice, 
'ever closer union' is a project designed to achieve 
further harmonisation amongst member states whose 
legal systems, employment practices, welfare 
provisions and economic policies are, by post 
Communist standards, remarkably harmonised 
already. Therefore, the challenge for a non-member 
is not simply one of catching up, but catching up 
with a moving target. This contradiction - between the 
'deepening' of Europe (the further integration of those 
already inside it) and its widening-can be directly 
attributed to the European model itself. Those whose 
preferred model of 'Europe' is one of intimate co-
operation between states which remain diverse, 
pluralistic and sovereign - electoral majorities in the 
UK and Scandinavia and sizeable minorities in France 
and Germany -are not in the driving seat. 
Second, and very much contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the EU has changed less than NATO since 
the division of Europe ended. As the quintessentially 
cold war institution, NATO came under pressure to 
transform or dissolve. Its principal response to this 
pressure, Partnership for Peace, has served - far 
more than its advocates first supposed - to soften 
the distinction between membership and non-
membership ofthe Alliance. NATO's professed aim, 
therefore, is to lower barriers between insiders and 
outsiders, and its 300 projects with Ukraine testifY to 
the attention which the goal receives. But as a non-
military institution, the European Union has largely 
escaped these pressures. Yet its model of integration, 
no less than NATO's model of defence, originated in 
the Cold War and, at least in part, reflected Cold War 
concerns: the need to give ( economic) substance, 
definition and integrity to an emerging security com-
munityin Western Europe then very much under threat 
from another part of Europe. The mechanisms to this 
end, protectionist as well as communautaire, were 
devised by governments whose aim was to contain the 
encroachments of the East rather than enlarge the 
domain of the West. Now that the tables have turned, 
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the Western model of integration risks damaging new 
allies as well as scoring' own goals' for the West itself. 
Ifa widening Europe does not reconsider the logic of 
'deepening', then EU enlargement could well become 
the process of moving barriers east. Paradoxically, 
tlien, the EU rather than NATO will 'create new dividing 
lines' in Europe, if not the economic equivalent of an 
iron curtain between the West and countries in whose 
welfare and security it has a profound stake. 
To be sure, the contradictions between deepening 
and widening do not affect Ukraine alone. Yet there 
are two specific dynamics ofpuropean integration 
which place Ukraine at a particular disadvantage. The 
first arises from the Franco-German relationship: a 
relationship which since its inception has been based 
upon a mutual fear of Germany. These fears have 
only advanced since unification moved Germany's 
centre of gravity east. Given what France regards as 
inevitable in these conditions- a special relationship 
between Germany and Russia - France is 
determined that Europe should have a special 
relationship with Russia, both to keep Germany 
'locked into' Europe and to persuade Moscow that 
its real partner is not Germany, but Europe as a 
whole. Measured against these strategic calculations, 
Ukraine's importance is questionable in French eyes 
and Ukraine's aims risk becoming a complication for 
French policy. 
Second, the French and many other EU members 
are convinced that there will be no European union 
worthy of the name until Europe acquires its own 
security and defence identity. In the French 
conception, such an entity should complement 
NATO, but it must not be integral to it, for Europe 
needs to establish a genuinely independent 
counterweightto the United States. This too 
increases the attractions of a Paris-Bonn-Moscow 
axis (institutionalised in the Chirac-Kohl-Yeltsin 
forum), but it also adds to the inconvenience of a 
NATO-fiiendly Ukraine. 
Yet there are signs that positions are beginning to 
shift. Thanks to the clarity and persistence of Borys 
Tarasyuk (then Ambassadorto Brussels and NATO) 
the first Ukraine-EU summit (February, 1998) was 
widely acknowledged to have concentrated minds. 
As a result, President Kuchma's decree (I I June, 
1998) on 'Ukraine's integration strategy towards the 
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European Union' has been well received by Brussels. 
Moreover, thanks not only to Ukrainian but Polish 
pressure, Europe has begun to negotiate over what 
had recently been non-negotiable: the implementation 
of Schengen and the possibility that its rigours might 
be relaxed to account for the special features of 
border regions. 
For all this, the fear that the EU sees Ukraine as 
'CIS', hence Eurasia, hence part of Russia's sphere 
of influence, runs deep in Ukraine. If there is any 
reality behind the fear, then EU objectives would be 
complementing Moscow's own. While several 
influential figures in Russia claim that EU 
membership for the Baltic states would widen 
Russia's 'window on Europe', it is revealing that 
Russian support for Ukraine's European vocation is 
virtually non-existent. This is the dog that does not 
bark in Russia's new and more conciliatory policy 
towards Ukraine. To the contrary, the proponents of 
Russia's new policy tend to argue that rapprochement 
with Ukraine will strengthen re-integration processes 
between Ukraine and Russia. 
Russia and Ukraine: progress and 
regression 
In his radio address on 21 November, President 
Yeltsin unwittingly confirmed what Ukrainians fear: 
that while Russians love Ukraine, they do not love its 
independence: 
Not so long ago, we had a joint economy. The 
Russians and Ukrainians lived in a communal 
fiat, so to speak [ . .} Some even took it into 
their heads to divide our common history and 
cultural legacy [ . .} Let us recall [ . .} how we 
were stung to the quick by reports on NATO 
manoeuvres in the Black Sea [ . .} Unfortunately, 
all of our difficulties have been skilfolly ex-
ploited by the Russian and Ukrainian opposi-
tion. I have to remind those Russian politicians 
who often go to Ukraine [ .. ] that no one is 
allowed to put Russia and Ukraine against each 
other[ . .} Today, Russian-Ukrainian relations 
are on the up. We have not forgotten how to 
rejoice in each other's successes [ . .} We are 
rooting for the Ukrainians in all the arenas and 
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stadiums of the world as we are for our own 
sportsmen. 56 
In Ukrainian eyes, there are far too many 
'enlightened' Russians willing to blame Russia for the 
'divorce' between the two nations, but unable to 
accept Ukraine's independence as anything more 
than the outcome of a family quarrel. Rare it is to 
find Russians who acknowledge what must be 
acknowledged in order for Ukrainians to view them 
Without suspicion: that for all the 'common history' 
which links Ukraine and R,ussia, for at least 300 
years there was also a separate history which has 
given Ukrainians an identity and a family of their 
own, There is nothing 'special' in the fact that this 
family is closely related to a larger family (q.v. the 
Austrians, the Norwegians, the Canadians and the 
Irish); and the fact that it is diverse and quarrelsome 
(q.v. the Germans, Italians and even the English) 
does not 'disprove' its existence. What remains to be 
seen is whether this nation has prevailed over the 
rigours of the Soviet' experiment' and whether, in the 
President's words, it can 'rally together at a crucial 
moment'. 
Therefore, the first (but surely the most subtle) 
problem for Ukrainians lies in the attitude of Russians 
who would improve relations, for such improvement 
is routinely seen as a sign that, within the de jure and 
'pragmatically' accepted constraints of Ukraine's 
independence and territorial integrity, de facto re-
integration is possible. Although the last Russian 
Minister for the CIS, Anatoliy Adamishin, was wise 
enough to call this perception 'an illusion', it is not 
uncharacteristic that one of the more influential 
architects of this improvement, former First Deputy 
Prime Minister Serov, had this to say after the official 
resolution of the Black Sea Fleet dispute: 
Anyone who wishes can become a third party in 
the Belarusian-Russian Union [ . .} Russia is 
developing relations with Ukraine now which 
are extremely important and of paramount 
significance. Ukraine is our main partner 
amongst the Slav states. 
Yet the greater, more obvious problem lies in the 
attitude of Russians who to this day find many of the 
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de jure realities unacceptable and refuse to renounce 
pressure as a means of changing them. Even before 
the dismissal of the Russian government in August, 
1998, these forces included the majority ofthe State 
Duma (who still refuse to ratify the Treaty on 
Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership, signed by 
Kuchmaand Yeltsin on 31 May, 1997 and ratified by 
the Verkhovna Rada on 14 January, 1998). One 
must also include Yuriy Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow, 
boss of a city providing 40 per cent of tax revenue to 
the Federation, an investor in the Crimean economy 
and an international actor in his own right. The roster 
must also include Yab/oko, the country's most 
prominent democratic opposition movement (which 
continues to reiterate its 'principled' opposition to the 
break-up of the Soviet Union), as well as several 
ob/ast' (regional) governors" a large proportion of 
the country's industrialists, bankers and energy 
sector bosses, and probably the majority of those 
who exercise power (officially and unofficially) in 
Russia's numerous power ministries. 
The third problem -and the most serious in 
structural terms - consists of Russia' s economic 
leverage over Ukraine. The volume of trade alone-
some six times greater than that between Ukraine and 
Germany and roughly ten times greater than that 
with Poh:l11d - confers leverage: a point well ex-
pressed by People's Deputy Volodymyr Hrynyov, who 
claimed that' losses caused by the [1996-7] trade war 
were much greater than the arrears in pensions and 
other social benefits.' Butitis Ukraine's energy and 
raw materials dependency which ensures thatthe prices 
agreed in Russian-Ukrainian trade are unlikely to be 
negotiated between equals. Today, Russia provides 
Ukraine with about 90 per cent of its oil and 60 per 
cent ofits gas;justas revealing is the fact that Russian 
energy goods and raw materials make up 60 per cent of 
the production costs of the ferrous metals, non-
precious metals and other semi-finished goods that 
account for 60 per cent of Ukraine 's exports. Ukraine's 
sole means of escape from this dependency- barter 
trade and non-payment - do not dispose of the 
inequality, since the terms of barter must be agreed 
with a stronger partner and since the valuation of debt is 
also subjectlo interpretation, politics and dispute. 
(Hence, when negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet 
broke down in October, 1996, Prime Minister 
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Chernomyrdin claimed that Ukraine owed Russia $6 
billion - a figure which shrank to $3 billion when the 
state treaty and intergovernmental accords were 
concluded in May, 1997). Moreover, the fact that 90 
per cent of Ukraine-Russia trade is dollar 
denominated means that no matter how much the 
rouble is devalued, even a modest devaluation of the 
hryvnya might increase the price that Ukraine will 
have to pay for Russian goods. 
The leverage afforded by these material 
inequalities is only multiplied by the cross fertilisation 
of Soviet era elites in the energy production, refining 
and transport sectors, not to say in heavy industry 
and the former defence-industrial complex. This 
cross fertilisation, in turn, is reinforced by intimate 
ties between 'new Russian' nomenk/aturas in 
banking and finance. The open manifestation of this 
conflation of elites can be seen in the calls within 
much of heavy and defence industry to 'revive 
production links', but more significantly in the long-
professed inter-state commitments to established 
trans-national 'financial-industrial groups' on 
Ukrainian soil (commitments yet to be realised thanks 
not only to political resistance in Ukraine, but the 
economic turmoil that frequently divorces word and 
deed in 'post Soviet space'). But it is the hidden 
influence of such unofficial networks which may 
have a far greater bearing on Ukraine's ability to be 
master of itself. The Chairman of the Crimean 
parliament, Leonid Hrach, may be right to warn that 
the privatisation of Chornomornajlohaz(Black Sea 
Oil & Gas) may 'play into the hands of shadow 
economic furces' and benefit 'the super monopolies 
that have mushroomed in Crimea and Ukraine' ," but 
he might have gone further and asked whY fronts for 
Gazprom and L UKoil should not be amongst these 
structures as they are at least rumoured to have been in 
Lithuania or, in far more transparent conditions, in 
Poland. The presence of six Russian security,and 
intelligence bodies on Ukrainian territory" is hardly 
irrelevant to these concerns when President Yeltsin 
himself defines 'guaranteeing free access to other 
countries' markets' as 'an important task both for 
foreign policy and the intelligence service'. 00 Until 
information about the ownership, capital and budgets 
of banks and enterprises is readily available - as 
analogous information would be in any serious British 
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or American library - the task which Yeltsin has set 
is likely to prove achievable in Ukraine. 
For all these long-standing difficulties, there have 
been genuine improvements in Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, and in the spring of 1997 these relations 
took what appeared to be a giant step forward. The 
1997 breakthroughs were threefold: the state visit to 
Ukraine (six times postponed) by the Russian 
President, Boris Yeltsin, the conclusion of an 
interstate Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and 
Partnership, as well as a Joint Declaration by the two 
Presidents (31 May), and not least important, the 
conclusion of 14 inter-governmental documents (28 
May), the most notable of which are three 
concerning the division, status and financing of the 
Black Sea Fleet. 
The apparent resolution of the long-standing 
Black Sea Fleet dispute was not only a breakthrough 
but a surprise, for the intergovernmental agreements 
signed by then Prime Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin 
and Pavlo Lazarenko were similar to, and in some 
ways more favourable to Ukraine than those which 
Russia had, to all intents and purposes, torpedoed in 
October 1996.61 Added to the signing ofthe long-
postponed 41-article inter-state treaty by the two 
state presidents on 31 May, the agreements altered 
the atmosphere and much of the substance of the 
Russian-Ukrainian relationship. The agreements, 
following in the wake ofthe elevation of Anatoliy 
Chubays and Boris Nemtsov (and less dramatically 
Ivan Rybkin)to senior positions in the Russian 
government are an encouraging reminder that 
Russia's foreign and security policy is not 
'objectively determined' and defined for all time, but 
the product of a particular political order and a 
particular set of political interests. But it is also a 
cautionary tale, for the radicals associated with the 
improvements (and further reinforced by the appoint-
ment ofSergey Kiriyenko as Prime Ministerin March 
1998) lost powerin the summer ofl998 and, in the 
view of many, are unlikely to return for the foreseeable 
future. 
Caution is also in order because, as is the case in 
many countries, beneficial changes in Russia's policy 
were motivated less by idealism and altruism than by 
a reasoned perception of pressure and threat. By the 
spring of 1997, the threats appeared to be threefold: 
I FS I nfo 6/98 
• the threat from within, in the form of the increased 
fragmentation of the multin~tionalRussian Federation 
(eerily reminiscent of the 'pre-crisis situation' 
confronting Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985); 
• the threat from the south, in the form of the 
Chechen tragedy and its continued reverberations 
throughout the Caucasus (reminiscent of the earlier 
trauma of Afghanistan) 
• the threat from the West, in the form of NATO 
enlargement (reminiscent o~ the' change of attitude' 
in the West associated with Ronald Reagan, 
rearmament and SDI) 
Where NATO enlargement was concerned, Ukraine's 
role had hardly been modest. The Tallinn 
communique of 27 May - in which Kuchma and 
Polish President Aleksandr K wasniewski backed the 
Baltic states' quest for NATO membership- was the 
culmination of a long-standing Ukrainian effort to 
persuade Russia that its policies were.driving Ukraine 
into the arms of NATO. The communique could not 
have failed to alarm Moscow. Within days of the 
accords, Yeltsin's press secretary and deputy, Sergey 
Yastrzhembskiy, plainly suggested that 'new thinking' 
was under way: 
We have to find the strength within ourselves to 
overcome this obsession with Sevastopol [ . .] 
Putting reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol 
with Russia on the agenda would be to launch a 
new Chechen war. If Russia and Ukraine can 
rise to the level to which de Gaulle and 
Adenauer rose in their time to solve the issue of 
Alsace and Lorraine, then we will be able to 
work together, help each other and overcome 
mistrust. We must look at the world with open 
eyes and see it as it really is. [emphasis 
added}" 
Yet even before the spring 1998 financial crises 
threatened to reverse the entire post-Communist 
direction of Russian policy, the 'breakthrough' raised 
a number of uncertainties. First, whilst the accords 
provided unequivocal recognition of Ukraine' s 
territorial integrity, they did nothing to diminish 
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Russia's principal levers of influence over Ukraine. 
Indeed, through these accords, Ukraine has 
conceded to Russia a right to maintain a substantial 
naval, military and intelligence presence on her 
territory for a generation. Moreover, once they are 
scrutinised, the naval, military and economic accords 
are far less advantageous to Ukraine than they first 
appear. They impose dysfunctional basing 
requirements on Ukrainian naval units, they leave 
Ukraine dependent upon Russian facilities for training 
and, not only in these respects, leave the orderly 
operation of the Ukrainian Navy dependent on 
harmonious relations with the Black Sea Fleet and 
Russian goodwill." 
The second uncertainty is posed by the latitude of 
interpretation that vague and highly imperfect 
accords allow. What is the underlying 'meaning' of 
the accords? Four months after the they were 
signed, Viktor Kravchenko, then Commander of the 
Black Sea Fleet, promised that 'The Black Sea Fleet 
will do everything in its power to ensure that [Sea 
Breeze-97] is the last [NATO] exercise in the region 
[ ... ] Our task is to tear Ukraine away from NATO's 
embrace'.64 Yeltsin himselfhas said that the aim of 
the accords is to ensure that 'we take part in 
defending Ukraine', an aim which Ukraine would 
certainly dispute. 
Third, in post-Soviet conditions there is a world 
of difference between agreements and their 
implementation:a point underscored by Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Pustovoytenko who stated, on the 
eve of his visit to Moscow in October 1997, that 'no 
substantial steps to give it [the accords] substance 
have been taken'. Indeed the most substantial step 
required, Russian parliamentary ratification of the 
'large-scale' (inter-state ) treaty (originally scheduled 
for 6 February), has been deferred by the State Duma 
on one pretext after another up to the present time. 
Indeed, six-to-seven supplementary agreements first 
envisaged in May 1997 and declared to be 'in prepara-
tion' eight months later are still awaited as of October 
1998. Amongst other issues, these agreements address 
the respective economic rights of Russia and Ukraine 
in Sevastopol, along with customs, excise and pensions 
provisions for BSF servicemen and employees, notlo 
say the still contentious issue of Ukraine' s rights to 
inspect BSF facilities, weaponry and units (an issue 
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which led Ukrainian CGS Zatinayko to express 
dissatisfaction 'that during inspections many foreign 
arms limitation groups visiting Ukraine were stopped 
at the gates of BSF units')." A related issue, 
demarcation of the inter-state border- an issue 
which has bedevilled relations almost as much as the 
issue ofthe Fleet - is still in limbo: despite its 
supposed resolution by the May accords, Russia had 
yet to appoint its side of the border commission as of 
24 February, 1998. 
But the fourth uncertainty, even in this most 
hopeful period of relations, ~as whether the ends of 
Russian policy had changed as much as the means. 
Just as Mikhail Gorbachev once calculated that he 
would achieve more influence over the West by 
moving military forces east than Brezhnev achieved 
by moving them west, so there is evidence to 
suggest that Rybkin and others believed Moscow 
would do more to strengthen 'reintegration 
processes' by opening Russian markets than by 
closing them. 
Subsequent summits and agreements have only 
underscored the ambiguities inherent in improved 
relations between an economically weak Ukraine and 
a friendly Russia Following a productive visit by 
First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays on I 
November, 1997 an informal summit between 
Kuchma and Yeltsin outside Moscow on 16-17 
November produced an undertaking to rescind the 
imposition of VAT on Ukraine's exports to Russia 
(imposed by Russia on 18 August 1996) and end the 
'trade war' that had lowered 1997 trade volume by 
17 per cent; at the same time, Russia at a direct cost 
of$250 million to itself, agreed to allow Ukraine a 
sugar-free export quota of 600,000 tonnes and a 25 
per cent tax reduction on exports above that level. Yet it 
was also at this summitthat Ukraine took steps to give 
substance to several vague aspirations set out in the 
May accords. Along with a more detailed cOlllmitment 
to establish financial-industrial groups and 'restore and 
strengthen production links', the most concrete and 
controversial step was to invite Russia to participate in 
the privatisation of Ukraine' s hitherto closed ('strate-
gic ') energy sector and to invest in the construction of 
nuclear plants atRovno and Khmelnytskyy.66 The 
summit also committed both countries to 'harmonise 
economic legislation' and draft a ten-year 'joint action 
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programme'. Neither then nor at the subsequent 30-
31 January, 1998 Moscow summit did anyone ask 
how Ukraine could harmonise economic legislation 
with Russia and with the European Union at the same 
time. 
The Russian financial crisis, the collapse of the 
Kiriyenko government (and of the brief acting 
government ofViktor Chernomyrdin) have replaced 
these ambiguities with anxiety. On the morrow of his 
appointment as acting Prime Minister, Chemomyrdin 
flew to Crimea and (according to unverified reports) 
demanded that Ukraine payoff its debt and remove 
the remaining obstacles to the establishment of four 
Russian-Ukrainianfinancial-industrialgroups. The 
visit dramatically illustrated one wider, international 
potential of Russia's crisis: destabilisationofthe 
fragile balance between the Russian Federation and 
its neighbours. 
The potential does not seem to have been lost on 
Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's newest Prime Minister 
and its longest serving Soviet era intelligence 
professional. As Chairman of the Russian 
Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), 
Primakov supervised the publication of a report 
which ackoowledged that the sovereignty of the 
newly independent states was 'irreversible', but 
nevertheless demanded that key areas of sovereignty 
be 'delegated'.67 In his last interview in this post, 
Primakov asserted that the SVR used 'all possible 
means' to facilitate 're-integration processes' in the 
'former Soviet Union' (thereby revealing at the same 
time that the SVR had been violating Russian 
Federation law banning its operation on the territory 
of the former USSR)." In his first (January 1996) 
press conference as Russian Federation Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Primakov assigned the strengthening 
of'centripetal processes' in the former Soviet USSR 
the key foreign policy priority, second only to the 
strengthening of the cohesion of the Russian Federa-
tion itself. As in Soviet times, he underscored the 
'objective character' of this policy-then the class 
struggle, now integration -and the 'hopelessness' of 
resisting it. Given the prominence that this theme has 
assumed throughout the post-Soviet phase of . 
Primakov's career, it would be surprising if the events 
which accompanied the visit to Ukraine of a delegation 
from the Russian State Duma on 28-29 September 
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were not the product of prior discussion between the 
Duma and the new Prime Mipister whose appointment 
they had so warmly supported. 
On 29 September, at a closed session of the 
VerkhovnaRada, Gennadiy Seleznev, Chairman of 
the Russian Federation State Duma and Russia's 
highest ranking Communist," received a '''hot'' 
reception [ ... ] never before conferred on a foreign 
guest'. Far from being surprised by his reception, it 
appears that Seleznev set the stage for it. First, he 
stated that the Duma would examine the interstate 
treaty in its autumn session .. Then he gently linked its 
approval to three reciprocal measures: satisfactory 
clarification (i.e. revision) of Ukraine's policy of co-
operation with NATO; ratification by the Rada of the 
three separate intergovernmental agreements on the 
Black Sea Fleet (which do not require ratification and 
which legally came into effect upon signature) and 
entry by the Rada into the Inter-parliamentary 
Assembly ofthe CIS. Finally, warming to his task, he 
stated: 
But still more, we would welcome the entry of 
Ukraine into the Union of Russia and Belarus. 
This would allow us to create a powerfol union 
of Slavic states. Without borders, without 
customs, with a single law our citizens would 
live, work, and receive education in any of the 
three states without considering themselves 
foreigners. -0 
It is possible that Seleznev will have only damaged 
his own cause by issuing this invitation, and this 
would certainly prove to be so if, in the words of 
Taras Stets'kiv (Deputy of the pro-presidential 
People's Democratic Party), 'the more Russian 
figures speak about such proposals, the more 
quickly Ukraine will strive to enter Europe'." But 
this prediction is not self-evidently true ",:hen half 
the parliament responds with 'stormy and 
prolonged applause', when the Speaker of the 
Ukrainian Parliament claims 'we have everything 
to gain'72 and when less than half the assembly 
pounds the table and walks out. Hence the verdict 
offormer President Kravchuk: 'Wise chap, 
knowing that the audience would divide into two 
mutually opposed camps'73 So in quieter ways 
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might the country. What a better way of 
establishingthe inability of Ukraine 'to rally together 
at a crucial moment'? 
Choices instead of conclusions 
If the distinction between Ukraine's 'independence' 
(its neza/ezhnist) and its 'ability to stand' (its 
samostiynist') remained a significant variable at a 
time when Russia was becoming more benign and 
stable, then it surely will become the crucial variable 
as Russia becomes more disturbed and 
unpredictable. It appears not only paradoxical, but 
counter-intuitive that the collapse of Russia's 
economy should strengthen Russia's influence over 
Ukraine rather than weaken it. Yet this process has . 
already begun, and it could well continue. Ukraine's 
dependencies on Russia, and the failures of its own 
elite and of the West's reformers to shift the balance 
makes Russia's power to damage seem greater than 
the West's power to deliver. This process will only 
be accelerated if the West's disillusionment (and the 
growing stress on its own economies) leads it to 
reassess its stake in Ukraine relative to other 
countries in Europe and other areas of the world. It 
is by no means inconceivable that this crisis-not 
NATO or EU enlargement - will establish the new, 
much dreaded dividing line between East and West: a 
line that places Poland west and Ukraine east. Well 
before this happens, Ukrainians will be under a 
strong temptation, and very strong pressure, to seek 
whatever guarantees and 'predictability' their eastern 
neighbour cares to afford them. 
Butthe relief that this brings to Ukraine - and the 
burdens it lifts from the West-can only be tempo-
rary. At a time when Russia seemed to be muddling its 
way through to success, Ukraine's more astute thinkers 
recognised that CIS integration represented the 'accel-
erated integration of underdeveloped markets'" and 'a 
guarantee oflong-term economic and technological 
backwardness'." At a time when Russia's economy is 
crumbling, when Russia's government lacks the means 
to go forward or back, and when Russia itself might 
unravel, such integration could become a negotiated 
descent into chaos, internal as well interstate. The 
belief that economic weakness will replace the divi-
sions Ukraine endures today with a consensus for 
26 
integration tomorrow is a dangerous illusion; more 
dangerous still are indications that Russia's new 
government subscribes to it. Indeed, integration a la 
Primakov and Seleznev will produce resistance in 
Ukraine and not only more division. Sooner or later, it 
could also produce a crisis which poses greater perils 
to Western and Central Europe than the present one 
does. 
Alternatively, the effects of this crisis - fear and 
what Franklyn Roosevelt called the fear of 'fear 
itself - might stimulate a remobilisation,notto say 
moral rearmament, of forces committed to survival. 
Even in the short term, the one positive effect of the 
crisis will be to demonstrate (in a way that not even 
NATO membership could) that Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland are now part of the West. 
Ukrainians are well aware of this- far more acutely 
than the NATO 16 - and for all the half truths about 
their 'endemic corruption', far more prepared to 
blame themselves than disillusioned Western partoers 
might suppose. This does not mean that Ukrainians 
can address their fundamental problems alone. Even 
the Marshal Plan was a plan. Although donors and 
recipients came from well established market 
economies, joint teams of experts devised and 
implemented detailed schemes for economic and 
national reconstruction. Why then should Ukraine be 
handed 'stabilisation funds' and 'thrown onto the 
market'? 
The current crisis is likely to be a defining 
moment for Ukraine and for the West as well. Even 
if the West redoubles its commitment (and 
reappraises its methods), the best that can be hoped 
for in the short term is to re-establish the country's 
direction. As the Chinese understand, ajourney of 
1,000 miles begins with a single step. The West, 
without abandoning its standards, its probity or its 
candour, will need to acquire some Chinese patience 
if it is to achieve its own strategic goals. , 
The West will also need to support Ukraine's 
efforts to establish the kind of'strategic partoership' 
with Russia that benefits Ukraine, not to say Russia 
itself. In a strong, samostiyna Ukraine - a Ukraine 
attracting Western investment and developing 
Western markets - the opening of Russian markets 
and the appearance of Russian investors would 
strengthen Ukraine further rather than weaken it 
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further. It would also benefit Europe because, 
amongst other things, it would pull Russia further 
into Europe in a way that successful change in the 
Baltic states and Central Europe cannot. Discomfited 
as Ukrainians are by the fact, Russians do not view 
Ukraine as they view Estonia; they view it as part of 
their own civilisation or at best (and more accurately) 
as a closely related one. If the West wishes to 
minimise the duration of Russia's new time of 
troubles, further it should think less about aiding 
Russia than about helping Ukraine to succeed. 
The potential for Ukraine to become a 'bridge' 
between Central and Eastern Europe, as Kuchma 
once hoped, and' a success in its own right, has not 
disappeared. StiIl, without critical thinking and a 
critical mass of heroic action, the likelihood is that 
Ukraine will become a fault line in the international 
system, not to say a domain of anxiety, intrigue and 
sadness. 
Notes 
IAlthough the result is rather less unfavourable to 
the President than originally assumed. Owing to the 
new electoral law - according to which half of 
Ukraine's 430 People's Deputies are elected 
proportionately on a party list system and half as 
individuals on a <tirst past the post' basis - it has 
taken some time for a precise factiona1line-up to 
emerge in the Verkhovna Rada. As of22 June, the 
authoritative tally (which fails to account for 26 
deputies) was: Communist Party - 121, People's 
Democratic Party - 90, Rukh - 47, Hromada - 44, 
Socialist and Peasant - 35, United Social Democratic 
Party - 27, Greens - 25, Progressive Socialists - 15. 
(UNIAN, 22 June, cited in BBC Summary oJWorld 
Broadcasts: Former Soviet Union [hereafter SWB] ). 
Although the left is not without its divisions, the anti-
Presidential forces (Communists, former Rada 
Chairman Konstantin Moroz's Socialist and Peasant 
faction, fonner Prime Minister PavIo Lazarenko's 
Hromada and the far left Progressive Socialists) can 
count on 215 firm supporters. For his part, the 
President can count on 189 conditional supporters: 
his 90 loyalists in the 'party of power' (PDP) along 
with his ambivalent allies in fonner Prime Minister 
Yevhen Marchuk's USDP, Rukh and the Greens. 
These figures, compared to earlier totals cited, 
suggest that there are now only 26 unaffiliated 
deputies out of 130 originally professing that status, 
with most of the remainder joining the PDP (which 
claimed a mere 28 deputies as of9 April). 
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2It is certainly commonplace within the rank and file 
of Rukh, whose traditional strengths in western 
Ukraine were substantially eroded by the PDP's 
determination to put up rival candidat~~ and split 
the centrist vote. The beneficiaries were the left, as 
well as the far right (who according to Rukh 
Chairman, Vyacheslav Chornovil,took 500,000 
votes from Rukh in western Ukraine) (UNJAN 30 
March in SWB 31 March, 1998). Chornovil also 
blamed the 'strategy of the Ukrainian President and 
his backers' for Communist inroads amongst the 
traditionally pro-Rukh Crimean Tatars (Interfax 30 
March, in SWB I April). See also the commentary in 
the Research Update, Ukrainian Center for 
Independent Political Resear~h (UCIPR), Vol. 4, No. 
115, 18 May, 1998. Some Russian commentary, too, 
argues that 'the crisis in the Verhovna Rada is 
objectively to the advantage of the President.' See 
Tat'yana Ivzhenko, 'Leonid Kuchma "Washes his 
Hands'" [Leonid kuchma 'umiyvaet rukil in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, pg. 5, 18 June, 1998. 
'ITAR-TASS, 9 July, 1998, cited inSWB 11 July 
1998. 
4Anatoliy Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in 
Ukraine: A System Emerging/ram Chaos 
(Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European 
Security Studies, Harmonie Paper I, 1997), p I. 
sIhe figure recorded in the 1989 census ofthe then 
Ukrainian SSR. This figure probably inflates the 
number of ethnic Russians because in the Soviet era 
ethnically mixed families often saw advantages in 
claiming Russian nationality. 
tiThe Russian Federation Military Doctrine adopted 
on 2 November 1993 (but soon to be superseded) 
defines 'the suppression of the rights, freedoms and 
legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian 
Federation in foreign states' as one of the 'main 
existing and potential sources of military threat 
outside the Russian Federation.' [emphasis added] 
See Charles Dick, 'The Military Doctrine oJthe 
ussian Federation', Jane's Intelligence Review 
Special Report, Coulsdon (January 1994) 
'This was obviously understood by Polish President 
Lech Walesa, who told a Ukrainian parliamentary 
delegation in December, 1994 that 'without an 
independent Ukraine, there cannot be an indepen-
dent Poland'. 
SMalcolm Ritkind during his state visit to Ukraine in 
September, 1995, on which occasion he also stated 
that 'Ukraine's size and strategic position make it one 
of Europe's pivots'. 
9By no means are such views confined to President 
Yeltsin's opponents, or to the immediate post-
independence period. As recently as April, 1995 
Yeltsin's then foreign policy adviser, Dmitriy 
27 
28 
Ryurikov, used exactly these words and ridiculed 
those who 'pretend that the countries [Ukraine and 
Russia] have simply parted, have divorced on the 
. basis of international law' , Kyivskiye Vedomosti 
[Kyiv News], Kyiv (28 April 1995) 
IOSlavomir Majman, Wiston House, Sussex on 8 
October 1993. 
'Wrv, 16 November 1997, cited in SWB, 18 
November 1997. In the same interview he stated, 
'the next problem to solve is where big-time oil will 
go from Balm [ ... ] I think that Russia has every 
chance of beating Turkey in this competition, Then 
underscoring the link between the economic, the 
political and strategic, he added, '[fwe are leaders 
rather than outsiders in this matter, we will not 
allow the US Sixth Fleet to enter [sic] or a major 
military exercise, let alone military conflict, to take 
place there,' 
12As a case in point, a Democratic Initiatives poll of 
Kyiv residents conducted at a high point of 
disillusionment, January 1995, revealed 62 per cent 
of ethnic Ukrainians and 58 per cent of ethnic 
Russians finnly in favour of independence; on the 
other hand, 16 per cent of Ukrainians and only 10 
per cent of Russians pronounced themselves against. 
it. 
13Crimea would make the total 25, but it has the 
status of Autonomous Republic rather than oblast', 
To the six westemmost ablasis, many would add a 
seventh, Rivne, which was re-absorbed by the 
USSR in 1939 but had been under Russian control 
from 1773 until the Treaty of Rig a in 1921. Four of 
the six, Volyn, L 'viv, Ivano-Frankivs 'k and 
Temopil', were annexed from Poland under the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939. A fifth, 
Chemivtsi (northern Bukovyna) was annexed from 
Romania in 1940, and the sixth, Zakarpatska, from 
Hungary in 1944. 
"On 17 July, 1996 VolodymyrHorbulin, Secretary 
of the National Security and Defence council 
(NSDC) went further, warning that the country 
'could lose independence' if episodes like the 
February and July 1996 Donetsk miners strike were 
repeated, SWB (19 July, 1996). 
'STar Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, 
pp31-32. Royal Institute oftnternational Affairs, 
London (1997) 
"On I March, 1995 the Rada rejected Kuchma's 
January decree, 'On Financial-Industrial Groups' for 
fear that Ukraine could be overwhelmed by Russian 
capital. It also' failed to support Defence Minister 
Valeriy Shmarov, whose dismissal in July, 1996 was 
widely linked with his support for closer defence 
co-operation with Russia. 
'7NataliaBelitser, 'National Minorities', in Visnyk: 
The Ukrainian Center of Human rights Herald, 
Issue 2, Kyiv (1995). _ 
I8The Russian concept and language are similar: 
nezavisimost' and samostoyatel:nost " 
19 According to the new Economics Minister, Vasyl 
Rohovyy on 25 May, total salary debts in Ukraine 
amount to HRN 5.5 billion ($2.8 billion), of which 
HRN 774 million are owed to state employees, 
SWB, 26 May, 1998. 
"President's speech of25 June, 1998 (SWB 29 
June) By 24 August, the figure for salary debts 
recorded for the first half of 1998 reached HRN 
6.068 billion. 
"It is the fable ofa poor peasan~ who tells the 
Pharaoh: 'you pose as the dam who keeps the poor 
man from drowning, but behold -thou art thyselfthe 
flood!' 
22 According to Social Security Minister AnatoIiy 
Kinakh, 19 June, SWB, 22 June, 1998. 
23Loss of confidence in domestic T-bills dates from 
late 1997. According to President Kuchma (9 April), 
even before the May financial crisis devastated 
Russia's finances and began to spill over into 
Ukraine, Ukraine was forced to offer 29 per cent 
interest on government bonds, compared to a 3 per 
cent interest rate for Lithuanian bonds and a 13 per 
cent rate for Russia. (SWB, 14 April, 1998). 
According to Economics Minister Rohovyy, the 
state owed HRN 6 billion on outstanding T-bills as 
of May, 1998 (SWB, 25 May, 1998). 
240ne should recall that the command economy was 
not designed to 'soften' market relations, but defY 
them. It aimed to maximise production rather than 
value and was so oblivious to issues of cost that 
even its currency bore little relationship to money, 
Across nearly every sector of industry in the Soviet 
Union, the cost of factor inputs (materials and 
labour) exceed the value of the end products they 
produced. In 'priority' sectors the rouble had as 
much as nine times the purchasing power it had 
elsewhere; in a country whose per capita GDP was 
at most 40 per cent the European average, per 
capita energy consumption was in dollar tenns 30 per 
cent above it. If, as many Ukrainians boast, their 
defence complex produced technology which rivalled 
that of British Aerospace, it did so at a cost that 
would have bankrupted British Aerospace and did so 
with plant aod materials which, to this day, British 
Aerospace and other Western finns are extremely 
reluctant to invest in. 
2SIn Communist countries, the tenn nomenklatura 
referred to those posts or persons sufficiently 
important to require Communist Party vetting and 
confinnation. The term therefore became 
synonymous with the ruling class in these countries. 
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Today, with less rigour, it refers toformer 
nomenklatura, their families, their allies and their 
heirs. 
2610 machine-building and metalIury. barter accounts 
for 45 per cent oftransactions; it accounts for 46.8 
per cent in chemical and oil products and 52.8 per 
cent in the electro-energy sector. (Biznes, no. 34 
(293),24 August, 1998, pg. 6) 
27 According to President Kuchma, there are over 800 
intermediary commercial organisations in the mining 
sector, and barter accounts for 80 per cent of all 
transactions. (ITAR-TASS, 17 June, 1998, cited in 
SWB. 20 June). The Minister of Interior, 
Kravchenko, linked these intennediaries to 99 cases 
of serious misappropriation (Intelnews, 22 June, 
SWB 23 June). In perhaps the most notorious case, 
that of the Ukrinterprodukt firm, over $6 million of 
budget funds were diverted. UkrinlerprodukJ'dealt 
with mines that received useless items like bins or 
glasses as payment [ ... ] As none of the managers of 
these mines [ ... ] complained, it is suspected that 
they had a personal interest in letting their mines 
undergo substantial financial losses' . Despite this, 
investigations into the firm, co-founded by the ex-
director of the Ukrainian Railways, 'was suddenly 
tenninated for no obvious reason. ' Corruption 
Walch, No. 7 (IO June, 1998), Ukrainian Centre of 
Independent Political Research. 
28Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Forecast: 
Ukraine, 2nd Quorler 1998, pg. 20. 
29According to Tyhypko. HRN Ukraine would need 
to pay HRN 2.5 billion debt service during the 
summer of 1998. At the same time, IBRD estimates 
were HRN 1.7 billion monthly debt servicing 
obligations if the 1998 state budget was reduced and 
HRN 4.7 billion jf it was not. Ukrainian TV, 1st 
Channel and Ukrainian Radio I st Channel, 20 June, 
1998, cited in SWB, 22 June, 1998. 
300n 7 February, 1997 the IMF mission to Ukraine 
recommended release of the 9th $90 million 
instalment in stand-by credit and promised to 
prepare the beginning ofan Extended Fund Facility 
loan of$2.5 billion, with $1 billion scheduled for 
dispersal in 1997. (Interfax, 7 February, 1997, 
reported in SWB, 11 February, 1997). 
31Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National 
Security and Defence Council, 'Ukraine's Place in 
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1995,pg.15. 
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"On 28 April, 1998 President Kuchma signed a 
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designed to supplement the 1995 Law 'On Fighting 
Corruption'. Analysis of the text has led at least one 
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